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Western Europe since 1990 
 Daniel   Oesch 
 Observers of social change have been fascinated for a long time by the ques-
tion of how the employment structure evolves: toward good jobs, bad jobs, or 
increasing polarization? Three issues are at stake. At the microlevel of single 
jobs, the concern is with the quality of new employment created. The question 
raised is to know whether jobs are becoming better paid, more highly skill ed, 
and endowed with greater autonomy.  At the macrolevel of social structure , the 
debate evolves around the question whether occupational change transforms 
affl uent countries into large middle-class societies or, on the contrary, into 
increasingly divided class societies.  The two levels of analysis are bridged by 
the concern for social mobility. Here, the question is as to whether change in 
the employment structure allows forthcoming generations to move to more 
rewarding jobs than those held by their parents  – or whether downward 
mobility is the more likely outcome. The direction of change has then man-
ifest implications for parties’ electoral constituencies and citizens’ political 
preferences . 
 This chapter strives to shed light on some of these issues by analyzing the 
pattern of occupational change in Western Europe since 1990. It does so by 
examining the evolution of the employment structure with large-scale micro-
level data for Britain, Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. The central 
question is to know what kind of occupations have been expanding and declin-
ing over the last two decades: high-paid jobs, low-paid jobs, or both ? 
 Our analysis shows that the fi ve countries under study underwent a process 
of major occupational upgrading.  The only ambiguity concerns the question 
whether the process is clear-cut or has a polarizing twist to it.  The labor mar-
ket created ample opportunities at the high-skilled end of the occupational 
structure but made perspectives bleak in the lower-middle range of jobs held 
by clerks and production workers . Depending on whether low-end services 
expanded or not, countries fi nd themselves with a more or less polarized 
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version of upgrading . In order to make sense of the pattern of occupational 
change, we examine how the class structure and the sector al distribution of 
employment evolved since 1990. In parallel, we discuss how it is possible that 
large numbers of low-skilled jobs vanished over the last two decades without 
leading to a signifi cant rise in low-skilled unemployment . The key lies in mas-
sive education al expansion: Not only low-skilled jobs, but also the low-skilled 
workers themselves have become more rare over the last two decade s. 
 By analysing occupational change in postindustrial economies, this chapter 
contributes to the overall framework of this book by shedding light on the 
demand side constraints of government choices. The introductory chapter to 
this volume argues that the feasible reform strategies of governments depend – 
among other factors – on the availability of potential sociostructural support 
coalition s. In this vein, occupational upgrading may alter the political balance 
of power among different classes and political concerns. 
 This chapter is structured as follows.  Section 4.1 presents a snapshot of the 
long-running debate in the social sciences on occupational change.  Section 4.2 
moves on to the empirical analysis and presents the data and analytical strat-
egy.  Section 4.3 documents change in the employment structure since 1990 and 
looks at the evolution of the class structure over the same period.  Section 4.4 
retraces the evolution of low-skilled unemployment and examines the increase 
in the workforce’s education al attainment.  Section 4.5 tentatively discusses the 
social and political implications of upgrading: its potential infl uence on social 
inequality and political preference s.  Section 4.6 concludes with a summary and 
an outlook. 
 4.1.  The Debate in the Literature on Occupational Change 
 The debate about the direction of occupational change is as old as the social 
sciences. Karl Marx, and Marxists after him, held a deeply pessimistic view 
of the impact of capitalism on the employment structure. Employers were 
expected to use technology in the struggle between antagonistic class es as a 
means to fragment work tasks, reduce work autonomy, and increase supervi-
sion.  Workers would become deskilled and the occupational structure down-
grade as self-employed artisans were gradually transformed into wage labor, 
craft workers into machinists, and clerks into operatives (Braverman  1974 ; 
Wright and Singelmann  1982 ). 
 This gloomy expectation contrasts with the optimistic view of Industrialism 
that North American social scientists developed in the postwar decades partly 
as a response to Marxist immiseration theory (Kerr et al.  1960 ; Blauner  1964 ). 
Industrial society and its corollary of a rationally developed technology were 
seen as leading to growing differentiation within the workforce and hence to 
an increased demand for skilled labor. From the late 1960s onward, industrial-
ism gives way to the theory of postindustrial society and the expectation that 
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economic activity would be dominated by knowledge workers (Fuchs  1968 ; 
Bell  1973 ). Scientifi c progress and service sector expansion were expected to 
increase the need for professional and managerial expertise constantly at the 
expense of routine production tasks.  In the early 1990s, this optimistic account 
of technology-driven upskilling became widely accepted in economics under 
the name of skill-biased technological change (SBTC). SBTC posits that tech-
nology is complementary to high-skilled labor but substitutes for low-skilled 
labor (Berman et  al.  1998 ). While  the occupational structure upgrades, the 
employment prospects of low-qualifi ed workers deteriorate. 
 In parallel to the expanding literature on SBTC, several authors maintained 
that the impact of technology on the employment structure is not stable over 
time: While electrifi cation and, more recently, computerization had increased the 
demand for skilled relative to unskilled labor, mechanization in the nineteenth 
century had shifted employment away from skilled artisans toward unskilled 
factory workers (Katz  1999 : 236, Manning  2004 : 603). This argument led to 
the routinization thesis of technological change :  The idea is that computers have 
taken over routine production and clerical tasks – yet these tasks are typically 
done in intermediate jobs. In contrast, computers cannot substitute for many 
interpersonal service tasks such as restaurant waiting, caregiving, or cleaning 
that are done in jobs set at the bottom of the occupational hierarchy. Modern 
technology may thus complement both high-skilled analytical and low-skilled 
interpersonal service jobs, but hollow out the middle of the employment struc-
ture , occupied by industrial workers and offi ce clerks (Autor et al.  2003 ) . 
 The polarization argument was already put forward in the 1970s and 1980s 
by proponents of dual labor market theories who argued that the workforces 
were divided into a primary (or internal) segment of well-paid and stable jobs 
occupied by insider s and a secondary (or external) segment of low-skilled 
and insecure jobs left to outsiders (Doeringer and Piore  1971 ; Lindbeck and 
Snower  1986 ). This division between a protected core and a vulnerable periph-
ery was explained either by fi rms’ response to technological change (Doeringer 
and Piore  1971 ) or by labor market institutions such as job protection legisla-
tion and collective bargaining rights (Lindbeck and Snower  1986 ) – a strand 
of research revived in recent years under the name of dualization (Emmenegger 
et al.  2012 ). 
 The focus on institutions has the advantage of explaining country differ-
ences in occupational change:  Unlike technology, institutions vary across 
economically advanced countries. Institutional accounts such as the varieties 
of capitalism approach thus expect occupational upgrading to take place in 
countries with strong vocational training systems, an equal skill structure, and 
coordinated wage bargaining – typically coordinated market economies such 
as the German-speaking and Nordic countries. In contrast, the more unequal 
skill distribution of liberal market economies such as Britain or the United 
States should translate into a more polarized pattern of occupational change 
(T å hlin 2007 : 46). 
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 A key issue in the analysis of occupational change is unemployment. 
Institutions such as extensive bargaining rights and high minimum wages may 
channel technological change into occupational upgrading . But if upgrading 
implies that a growing proportion of low-skilled workers are priced out of the 
labor market, a new social divide emerges – not based on unequal earnings, but 
on unequal access to jobs. Countries may thus have the choice between two 
undesirable outcomes: occupational upgrading at the cost of unemployment or 
labor market integration of the low-skilled with the drawback of a polarized 
earnings structure (Krugman  1994 ; Iversen and Wren  1998 ; Scharpf  2000 ). 
The central issue of the debate on occupational change thus concerns the pros-
pects that postindustrial labor markets offer to low-skilled workers . 
 What does the empirical evidence tell us about the pattern of occupational 
change? From the 1960s up to the 1990s, three trends have been common to 
economically advanced countries: fi rst, the phasing out of agricultural employ-
ment and the spectacular drop among farmhands; second, the steady decline 
of manufacturing jobs, most notably among operatives; third, the rise of busi-
ness, health, and social services, mainly creating jobs for (associate) manag-
ers and (semi)profession als (Castells and Aoyama  1994 ; Berman et al.  1998 ; 
Juhn  1999 ). The seemingly continuous shift away from lower toward higher 
skilled work is all the more spectacular if one adopts a longer time horizon and 
accepts the argument that the majority of preindustrial labor was low-skilled, 
backbreaking, monotonous, and unrewarding (Attewell  1987 : 334). 
 While much of the international evidence points toward occupational 
upgrading, this consensus view was shattered in the early 2000s by two studies 
fi nding a trend toward polarization in the United States (Wright and Dwyer 
 2003 ; Autor et al.  2008 ). In a large-scale analysis covering four decades, Erik 
Wright and Rachel Dwyer ( 2003 ) document the shift in the American job 
structure from  unequivocal upgrading in the 1960s and 1970s to relatively 
even job growth in the 1980s and fi nally to polarization in the 1990s . Large 
employment gains in business services and public administration explain the 
expansion at the top, whereas retail trade and personal services provided the 
jobs at the bottom – jobs largely fi lled by the growing immigrant Hispanic 
workforce (Wright and Dwyer  2003 : 309). As evidence on the American labor 
market accumulated, a new consensus emerged: The U.S. employment struc-
ture had become subject to an unbalanced –  polarized  – pattern of growth in 
the 1990s, with strong job expansion at the top, stagnant employment in the 
middle, and small growth in occupations at the bottom (Ilg and Haugen  2000 ; 
Autor et al.  2003 ,  2008 ; Rehm  2010 : 381). 
 The controversial question is to know to what extent the American pat-
tern of occupational change also applies to Western Europe.  Findings are most 
ambiguous for Britain. In terms of skills, a battery of different measures points 
to substantial upskilling of the British labor market over the period 1986–2006 
(Felstead et  al.  2007 ) . In contrast, an infl uential study defi ning occupations’ 
quality not based on their skill requirements, but their median earnings, fi nds 
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a clear polarizing trend for the period 1979–1999 (Goos and Manning  2007 ). 
Two occupational groups account for this simultaneous expansion at the 
extremes: low-paid welfare state occupations such as nursing aides and educa-
tional assistants as well as high-paid business service occupations such as consul-
tants, treasurers, and computer programmers (Goos and Manning  2007 : 124). 
 Polarization does not describe well the evolution of the employment struc-
ture in other European countries. Three comparative studies report a ten-
dency toward occupational upgrading in most Western European countries 
(Fern á ndez-Mac í as  2012 : 15, Hurley and Fern á ndez-Mac í as  2008 : 12, T å hlin 
 2007 : 71). Particularly small affl uent countries such as Denmark , Swed en, or 
Switzerland seem to have witnessed a signifi cant and linear upgrading of their 
employment structure ( Å berg  2003 : 203, Korpi and T å hlin  2009 : 192, Skaksen 
and S ø rensen  2002 ; Sheldon  2005 ).  More controversial are fi ndings for Spain 
and Germany. In Spain, both the number of profession als and – albeit more 
weakly – that of low-skilled service workers have increased over the last thirty 
years (Bernardi and Garrido  2008 ) . In Germany, high-paid and high-skilled 
occupations grew substantially over the 1980s and 1990s. But at the same 
time, midrange jobs disappeared more quickly than those at the bottom end of 
the labor market (Dustmann et al.  2009 : 871, Spitz-Oener  2006 : 262). Unlike 
the American experience, the German occupational structure may thus have 
polarized not because low-end jobs expanded – they probably did not – but 
because intermediary jobs decreased to a greater extent. 
 This overview suggests that up to the end of the 1980s, labor market 
researchers agreed in their verdict of occupational upgrading. This consensus 
no longer holds for the period after 1990. While the fi nding of polarization 
for the United States seems well established, the evidence for Western Europe 
is inconclusive. Accordingly, this chapter examines these two areas of uncer-
tainty:  the pattern of occupational change in Western Europe in the 1990s 
and 2000s . 
 4.2.  Country Selection, Data, and Strategy of Analysis 
 Our empirical analysis focuses on fi ve West European countries:  Britain, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland. We thus choose the “most sim-
ilar systems design” (Przeworski and Teune  1970 ) with the objective to com-
pare countries that differ little on a range of explanatory factors such as 
economic affl uence and technological advancement. This makes it more likely 
that observed changes in the phenomenon to be explained are caused by those 
explanatory factors by which these countries do differ, notably labor market 
institutions.  Our group of countries provides us with four different sets of 
institutions governing social policy and the labor market (Esping-Andersen 
 1990 ):  a liberal Anglo-Saxon welfare regime (Britain), a social democratic 
Scandinavian regime (Denmark), a conservative Mediterranean regime (Spain), 
and  a conservative continental regime (Germany, Switzerland). We select two 
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continental countries to account for the fact that this group of welfare regimes 
is both largest and internally most heterogeneous . For these fi ve countries, 
changes in the occupational structure are examined for the two decades since 
German reunifi cation, the period between 1990/1 and 2007/8. The two cutoff 
points constitute the end of long cyclical upswings that were then followed by 
OECD -wide recession s (1991–1993 and 2008–2010). 
 Our empirical analysis is based on large-scale microlevel data sets that 
contain detailed information on individuals’ occupation, earnings and educa-
tion: the national labor force surveys for Britain (UK-LFS), Spain (EPA), and 
Switzerland (SAKE); the Danish labor force survey stemming from Denmark’s 
cooperation with Eurostat (EU-LFS); and the German Socio-Economic Panel 
(SOEP). Danish EU-LFS, German SOEP, and Swiss SAKE are annual surveys, 
whereas Spanish EPA and – beginning in 1993 – British LFS are carried out on 
a quarterly basis. For these two surveys, we choose the spring quarter.  Table 4.1 
gives an overview of the key features of these datasets. 
 We examine occupational change with the analytical strategy developed by 
Erik Wright and Rachel Dwyer ( 2003 ), which is based on the following three 
steps. First, we restrict our sample to people aged 18 to 65 years who spend 
at least twenty hours per week in paid employment. For these individuals, 
 occupations are distinguished as precisely as possible given the data at hand 
 Table 4.1.  Key features of the data sets used 
 British Labor 
Force Survey 
 Danish Labor 
Force Survey 
 German Socio-
Economic Panel 
 Spanish Labor 
Force Survey 
 Swiss Labor 
Force Survey 
 LFS  EU-LFS  SOEP  EPA  SAKE 
 Period 
covered in 
study 
 1991–2008  1992–2007  1990–2007  1990–2008  1991–2008 
 Sample size,* 
early 1990s 
 54,760  10,965  7,977  58,582  8,490 
 Sample size,* 
end of 
2000s 
 41,402  51,062  9,400  62,697  23,351 
 Information 
on 
occupation 
 soc90 3-digit 
 soc2000 
3-digit 
 isco88 
2-digit 
 + nace 
industry 
 isco88 
4-digit 
 cno94  isco88 
4-digit 
 Earnings 
included 
 Yes (after 93)  No  Yes  No  Yes 
 Other 
database 
used for 
earnings 
 No  EU-SILC  No  CIS 1989, 
1990, 
2006 
 No 
  Note :  *Our samples include individuals aged 18 to 65 years who spend at least 20 hours per week 
in employment. 
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(isco88 at the four-digit level or comparable codes). Occupations containing 
fewer than ten individuals reporting wages are merged with similar occupa-
tions to increase the accuracy of our estimates. Since occupations are coded 
at a more aggregated level in the Danish survey, we combine them with infor-
mation on the economic sector in order to obtain a more fi ne-grained mea-
sure of occupations. 1 Depending on the country, we distinguish among 108 
(Denmark), 120 (Spain), 145 (Germany), 161 (Switzerland), and 171 (Britain) 
different occupations. 
 Second, we determine an occupation’s quality on the basis of its median 
earning – in our view the most consequential and most reliably measurable 
indicator of what is a good or bad job. We thus equate occupational upgrading 
with an expansion of occupations with a comparatively high median earning 
at the expense of occupations with a low median earning. 2 
 Third, once we have calculated the median earning of each occupation over 
the period of interest, we rank-order the occupations from the lowest- to the 
highest-paid.  These rank-ordered occupations are then grouped into fi ve equally 
large quintiles, containing as close as possible to 20 percent of total employ-
ment at the beginning of the period under study. The bottom quintile 1 thus 
holds the 20 percent of employment in the occupations with the lowest median 
earnings and the top quintile the 20 percent of employment in the occupations 
with the highest median earnings. The occupational hierarchy looks surpris-
ingly similar in the fi ve countries under study. Sales assistants, waiters, and 
farmhands are found in the bottom quintile 1, bricklayers and truck drivers in 
the lower-middle quintile 2, secretaries and machine mechanics in the middle 
quintile 3, nurses and police offi cers in the upper-middle quintile 4, and senior 
offi cials, computer profession als, and doctors in the top quintile 5. 
 These fi ve quintiles constitute the building block of our analysis: We deter-
mine the pattern of occupational change on the basis of how occupations in 
 1  Unlike Wright and Dwyer ( 2003 ), we explicitly integrate the industry-part of an occupation only 
for Denmark. For the other four countries, information on the sector of employment (industry) is 
only used for a few large and indeterminate occupations such as senior offi cials, managers, secre-
taries and elementary occupations in the Swiss database and business owners, mid- and low-rank 
offi ce clerks, operators of mobile machinery, truck drivers and cleaners in the Spanish dataset. 
 2  An occupation’s median earning is calculated as the average of its standardized hourly median 
earning at the beginning and end of the period under study, weighted by the number of indi-
viduals employed in the occupation at a given moment. The Danish EU-LFS and the Spanish 
EPA surveys do not include information on earnings. For Denmark, we determine occupations’ 
median earnings based on combined data stemming from the three Danish EU-SILC surveys 
2004, 2005 and 2006. The Danish case is particular in our analysis insofar as occupations’ 
rank-ordering (based on their median earnings) refl ects the situation at the end of the period 
under study. For Spain, we calculate occupations’ median earnings by relying on three surveys 
performed by Spain’s Centre for Sociological Research (1989, 1990, 2006). The 1990 survey 
was combined with the 1989 survey to provide single estimates of occupational earnings for the 
beginning of the period analyzed. These calculations were carried out by Jorge Rodriguez Menes 
at the University Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. 
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these quintiles evolve in terms of employment. Rather than representing the 
current distribution of jobs, we thus measure  net change by taking into account 
both job destruction and job creation (for more details on the analytical strat-
egy, see Oesch  2013 : 37–42). 
 4.3.  Empirical Evidence of Occupational Change since 1990 
 What has occupational change looked like over the last two decades?  Figure 4.1 
shows that in all fi ve countries under study, employment expanded most at the 
top of the occupational hierarchy .  The occupations set in quintile 5 increased 
their employment share by 5 percentage points in  Denmark (from 20 to 25 per-
cent), by 7 in Germany, by 9 in Britain, and  even by 10 percentage points in 
Spain and Switzerland. While employment tended to decrease everywhere in 
the lower half of the occupational hierarchy, there is substantial cross-country 
variation. In relative terms, Germany and Spain witnessed the largest job losses 
in the lowest-paid occupations of quintile 1, Denmark in quintile 2, and Britain 
and Switzerland in the middle quintile 3 . 
 The hypothesis of occupational downgrading can clearly be rejected for the 
period under study. On the contrary, for Germany and Spain the evidence points 
toward unambiguous upgrading . The same fi nding applies to Denmark and 
Switzerland  – although midrange jobs declined somewhat more than low-end 
jobs .  In contrast, results for Britain suggest a pattern of polarized upgrading 
–8
–6
–4
–2
0
2
4
6
8
10
CH,
1991–2008
DE,
1990–2007
DK,
1992–2007
ES,
1990–2008
UK,
1991–2008
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
 Figure 4.1.  Relative employment change in job quality quintiles (in percentage points). 
 Q1 stands for  quintile 1 , which held – at the beginning of the period under study – the 
20 percent of employment in the occupations with the lowest median earnings.  Q5 
stands for  quintile 5 , which comprised – at the beginning of the period under study – the 
20 percent of employment in the occupations with the highest median earnings. 
 (The analyses for Spain were generously provided by Jorge Rodriguez Menes, University 
Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona) 
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with very strong employment growth at the top of the occupational hierarchy, 
substantial losses in the middle, and modest growth in the bottom-end quin-
tile. Britain’s pattern of occupational change closely resembles that found for 
the polarizing U.S. employment structure over the 1990s (Wright and Dwyer 
 2003 ; Autor et al.  2008 ). 
 The evidence presented earlier suggests that West European labor markets 
have created a disproportionate share of job opportunities in high-paid occu-
pations of quintile 5 and thus provided labor market entrants with improving 
occupational prospects over the last two decades. Intergenerational mobility 
should thus have risen as older birth cohorts working in menial occupations 
leave the labor force and retire, while younger generations enter the labor 
market and take on more qualifi ed occupations. We examine this hypothesis 
by comparing how age cohorts were distributed across quintiles in 1990/1 
and 2007/8. For this reason, we distinguish four age cohorts (25–29, 30–34, 
35–39, 40–44 years), compute the distribution across quintiles of workers in 
a given age cohort in 1990/1 and 2007/8, and then calculate relative change 
in employment across quintiles between 1990/1 and 2007/8 for the same age 
cohort. 
 The results are shown in  Figure  4.2 for four countries (these analy-
ses were not run for Spain). The most interesting fi nding concerns the two 
youngest cohorts no longer in full-time education, +workers aged 25–29 and 
30–34 years. Everywhere, workers in these two age brackets were much more 
likely to obtain a job in a top-end occupation of quintile 5 in 2007/8 than 
had been the case for young cohorts in 1990/1. Young people thus were, on 
average, entering the labor market in more advantageous occupations in the 
mid-2000s than in the early 1990s. Occupational change over the last two 
decades provided succeeding cohorts with greater opportunities for upward 
mobility. Yet  Figure 4.2 also reveals that age cohorts did not experience a lin-
ear pattern of occupational upgrading. In the four countries analyzed, young 
workers were in 2007/8 both more likely to have a job in the top-end quintile 
5  and in the bottom-end quintile 1 than were young workers in 1990/1.  In 
other words, entering cohorts in the mid-2000s strongly expanded their rela-
tive employment in well-paid occupations of quintile 5 at the expense of the 
intermediate quintiles, but employment in the low-end quintile 1 also increased 
moderately (except in Switzerland). Moreover, the largest decline of employ-
ment opportunities over time occurred everywhere in the two lower-middle 
quintiles 2 and 3.  The rise in occupational polarization of successive cohorts is 
particularly marked in the United Kingdom , but also evident for Germany and, 
to some extent, Denmark and Switzerland. 
 What did occupational change look like in terms of class locations? We 
examine this issue by using a detailed measure that discriminates  hierarchically 
between more or less privileged employment relationships and  horizontally 
between different work logics (see Oesch  2006 ). Combining the two dimen-
sions provides us with the eight-class schema shown in  Table 4.2 , which reveals 
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that occupational upgrading was driven by two categories:  managers and 
sociocultural professionals .  Together with technical profession als, they con-
stitute the strongly expanding salaried middle class. At the beginning of the 
1990s, only 32 to 35 percent of the labor force belonged to the salaried middle 
class, as compared to 42 to 45 per cent at the end of the 2000s. 
 In contrast, primarily two categories lost out from occupational change: offi ce 
clerks and production workers .  The former shrank dramatically in Denmark 
and Switzerland ; the latter declined most strongly in Britain and Germany. 
Since clerks cluster in the middle of the earnings distribution, their decline con-
tributed to the hollowing out of the job structure. In comparison, the decrease 
among production workers was more evenly distributed across the lowest 
four quintiles (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes  2011 : 524). Production workers, 
CH, 1991–2008 DE, 1990–2007
DK, 1992–2007 UK, 1991–2008
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 Figure  4.2.  Change in the distribution of relative employment across quintiles for 
identical age cohorts. 
 Note : vertical columns show for Switzerland that workers aged 25–29 were 36 percent 
more likely to be employed in quintile 5 in 2008 than were workers aged 25–29 in 1991 
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service workers, and clerks occupy the twilight zone below the middle class, 
made up of working-class and lower-middle-class positions. Taken together, 
the employment share of these three occupational classes decreased from 60 
to 47 percent in Germany, from 55 to 48 in Denmark , from 54 to 42 per cent 
in Switzerland , and from 52 to 43 percent in Britain over the last two decades . 
As a result, the working- and lower-middle classes combined account today for 
about the same proportion of the labor force as the salaried middle class in all 
four countries . 
 A widely echoed expectation in the political economy literature of the 
1990s was that employment growth in the age of globalization would have 
to arise mainly from low-paid private services (e.g., Iversen and Wren  1998 ; 
Scharpf  2000 ).  Table 4.3 disaggregates occupational change according to the 
economic sector and shows that, contrary to popular perception, the share 
 Table 4.2.  Change of workforce in eight occupational classes (share in 
percentage), 1990/1–2007/8 
 Interpersonal 
Service Logic 
 Technical Work 
Logic 
 Organizational 
Work Logic 
 Independent Work 
Logic 
 Sociocultural 
(semi) 
professionals 
 Technical (semi) 
professionals 
 (Associate) 
managers 
 Liberal professionals 
and large 
employers 
 Medical doctors 
 Teachers 
 Social workers 
 Engineers 
 Architects 
 Technicians 
 Administrators 
 Consultants 
 Accountants 
 Entrepreneurs 
 Lawyers 
 Dentists 
 CH 
 DE 
 DK 
 UK 
 11  → 14 
 10  → 14 
 15  → 17 
 9  → 13 
 10  → 11 
 10  → 10 
 8  → 8 
 8  → 8 
 11  → 18 
 13  → 18 
 11  → 18 
 17  → 23 
 3  → 5 
 1  → 3 
 2  → 3 
 2  → 2 
 Service workers  Production 
workers 
 Offi ce clerks  Small business 
owners 
 Assistant nurses 
 Waiters 
 Shop assistants 
 Mechanics 
 Carpenters 
 Assemblers 
 Secretaries 
 Receptionists 
 Mail clerks 
 Shop owners 
 Independent artisans 
 Farmers 
 CH 
 DE 
 DK 
 UK 
 13  → 13 
 10  → 11 
 18  → 18 
 11  → 15 
 24  →  19 
 36  →  23 
 24  → 21 
 25  → 16 
 17  →  10 
 13  →  13 
 13  →  8 
 16  → 12 
 11  → 11 
 6  →  7 
 9  →  7 
 12  → 11 
  Notes :  Values in gray/  in boxes indicate an employment share in 2007/8 that is 20 percent higher/ 
 20  percent  lower than in 1990/1. The shares refer to a target population of individuals aged 
18–65 years who spend at least 20 hours per week in paid employment. 
 Source : Own computation based on the data sets presented in  Table 4.1 . 
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of employment in private consumer services such as retail trade, restaurants, 
and hotels decreased (in Denmark , Britain , or Switzerland ) or increased very 
little (in Germany and Spain ). While private consumer services stagnated and 
manufacturing continued to lose jobs in all countries,  strong employment 
growth took place in two areas: in social services mainly set in the public sec-
tor and in business services mainly set in the private sector (IT and commu-
nication, banking and real estate) .  This pattern of sector shifts also explains 
why the problem of stagnant productivity in services (known as “Baumol’s 
disease”) is overstated: Growth has taken place in highly productive service 
sectors, among computer programmers and legal consultants, rather than 
among domestic aides and waiter s . 
 Where does the tendency toward polarization originate? Not from McJobs in 
retail trade and restaurants, but from social services. Jobs in health care ,  social 
work, and education expanded not only at the top of the employment structure, 
but – albeit to a lesser extent – also at the bottom end.  Growth of social services 
in the low-end quintile 1 was not only signifi cant in the United Kingdom, but 
also in Denmark and Spain . In the United Kingdom, polarization of the occu-
pational system is driven by the evolution in social service jobs, which were cre-
ated in great numbers both at the top and at the bottom, but not in the middle 
of the employment structure (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes  2011 : 526). 
 4.4.  Upgrading at the Cost of Unemployment? 
 The upgrading thrust may not warrant excessive optimism if it occurs at the 
cost of unemployment – if the low-skilled have simply been pushed out of the 
labor market. In this case, governments face a diffi cult trade-off: They can pro-
tect their wage structure and hence smother the growth of low-wage services. 
 Table 4.3.  Employment across sectors in 1990/1 and 2007/8 (in percentage) 
 Agriculture  Manufacturing  Construction  Sales, 
Hotels and 
Restaurants, 
Personal 
Services 
 Business 
Services 
Including 
Transports 
 Social Services 
and Public 
Administration 
 CH  4  → 4  24  → 18  7  → 7  25  → 22  22  → 25  18  → 25 
 DE  4  → 1  37  → 27  8  → 6  14  → 18  13  → 18  23  → 30 
 DK  5  → 3  21  → 16  6  → 7  32  → 20  12  → 20  24  → 32 
 ES  12  → 4  23  → 17  10  → 13  17  → 18  27  → 29  11  → 20 
 UK  2  → 2  27  → 16  9  → 9  20  → 16  20  → 26  22  → 32 
  Notes :  Values in gray/  in boxes indicate an employment share in 2007/8 that is 20 percent higher/ 
 20 percent lower than in 1990/1. 
 Source : Own computations based on the data sets presented in  Table 4.1 ; Jorge Rodriguez Menes 
for Spain. The sample has been restricted to individuals aged 18–65 years who work at least 20 
hours per week. 
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Thereby, they limit wage inequality and achieve occupational upgrading but 
have to cope with growing unemployment among the low-skilled who are 
priced out of the labor market (Krugman  1994 ; Scharpf  2000 ). 
 The trade-off between upgrading and full employment should play itself 
out at the labor market’s bottom end. Accordingly, we examine in  Table 4.4 
low-skilled workers’ unemployment rates. 3 They are averaged over fi ve-year 
periods in order to smooth out the business cycle effect. Still, low-skilled unem-
ployment closely trails the cyclical evolution of general unemployment – when 
general unemployment rose or fell, low-skilled unemployment followed suit. 
Over the period under study, low-skilled unemployment thus increased sub-
stantially in Germany and more moderately in Switzerland , while it gradually 
declined in Britain and  Denmark prior to the global fi nancial crisis in 2008. In 
Spain , low-skilled unemployment embarked – like general unemployment – on 
a spectacular roller-coaster journey, with a steep hike in the early 1990s, an 
even more massive fall between 1995 and 2007, and a staggering rise thereafter. 
 Did occupational upgrading ruin low-skilled workers’ labor market pros-
pects?  Table  4.4 throws doubts on this gloomy expectation:  In 2008, the 
low-skilled unemployment rate was below 7 percent in Britain , Denmark, and 
Switzerland – and thus moderate despite an ongoing process of occupational 
upgrading. Most notable is the evolution in the two small countries in our 
sample, Denmark and Switzerland. Neither country witnessed a polarization 
of its employment structure. In effect, job losses in the bottom-end quintile 1 
were substantial in both countries (-42,000 jobs in Denmark between 1992 
and 2007, -53,000 in Switzerland between 1991 and 2008)  – yet low-skilled 
unemployment did not skyrocket. On the contrary, in Denmark it continuously 
declined over the 1990s and 2000s and fell below 4 percent prior to the Great 
Recession . 
 Unemployment rates paint a too-optimistic picture of low-skilled individu-
als’ employment opportunities if involuntary labor market withdrawal takes 
other forms such as disability or early retirement . We check this possibility by 
computing in  Table 4.4 the low-skilled employment rate, which measures the 
proportion of low-skilled working-age adults (aged 25 to 64 years) who are 
in gainful employment – and are thus neither unemployed nor economically 
inactive.  Table 4.4 shows that over the last two decades, Denmark and Spain 
succeeded in signifi cantly raising the employment rate of their low-skilled 
working-age population. In Britain , the low-skilled employment rate remained 
at a comparatively high level of 65 percent between 1997 and 2008 .  In con-
trast, Germany and Switzerland’s low-skilled employment rate rose and fell 
in unison with the business cycle , all the while showing a slight downward 
trend. Interestingly, country differences became smaller over time but did not 
 3  The low-skilled are defi ned as having an educational attainment of lower-secondary school or 
less, that is no more than 9 to 10 years of formal education (ISCED levels 0–2). 
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disappear. Britain , Denmark, and Switzerland feature substantially higher 
employment rates among the low-skilled than Germany and Spain. 
 Table 4.4 points out two interesting conclusions. First, there is no clear-cut 
trend toward reduced labor market participation of low-skilled adults in the 
fi ve European countries under study. Rather than showing a secular decline, 
low-skilled workers’ employment rates refl ect the underlying business cycle , 
strongly expanding during Spain’s labor market boom 1995–2007 and con-
tracting during Germany’s economic recessions .  Second, countries with com-
paratively low wage inequality and a strong trend toward upgrading such as 
Denmark and Switzerland seem at least as successful in integrating low-skilled 
workers into the labor market as Britain , where high wage inequality and 
a polarizing occupational structure should have stimulated the creation of 
low-paid jobs to a greater extent than elsewhere . Evidently, the trade-off argu-
ment continues to fare badly in empirical scrutiny (see also Nickell and Bell 
 1996 : 307; Card et al.  1999 : 870; Glyn  2001 : 701; Bosch  2009 : 349). 
 How is it possible that large numbers of low-skilled jobs have vanished over 
the last two decades without leading to a signifi cant rise in low-skilled unem-
ployment or to a massive drop in low-skilled workers’ labor market partici-
pation? 4 The answer is strongly related to the evolution of skill supplies: Not 
only have jobs for the unqualifi ed become more rare, but so have the unqual-
ifi ed people themselves.  Goldin and Katz ( 2007 ) argue that labor markets 
evolved in the twentieth century as the result of a race between education and 
 Table 4.4.  Low-skilled unemployment and employment rates averaged over 
fi ve-year periods (in percentage) 
 Low-Skilled  Unemployment Rate  Low-Skilled  Employment Rate 
 91–95  96-00  01-05  06-08  91–95  96-00  01-05  06-08 
 CH  4  6  6  7  68  68  67  66 
 DE  11  15  17  18  53  48  51  50 
 DK  11  8  7  4  62  61  62  65 
 ES  18  17  11  10  47  50  57  60 
 UK  12  10  6  6  61  65  66  65 
  Note :  The low-skilled employment rate measures the employment-to-working-age population 
ratio for low-skilled individuals aged 25–64 years. Low education is defi ned as ISCED levels 0–2 
(preprimary, primary, and lower secondary education). 
 Source : OECD, Education at a Glance Database. 
 4  Nor has there been a signifi cant widening in  lower-tail wage inequality. Over the period 
1990–2005, the gap between the median wage and the wage at the 1st decile (p50/p10) seems to 
have remained stable in the majority of OECD countries, notably in Britain, Switzerland and the 
U.S. (OECD  2007 : 128). An exception is Germany where lower-tail wage inequality has been on 
the rise since the mid-1990s (Antonczyk et al.  2009 : 9). 
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technology: Permanent technological change increased fi rms’ demand for skills 
and massive educational expansion increased workers’ supply of skills. In this 
race, educational advance seems to have kept up with technological progress 
in the countries under study . 
 In Western Europe, educational expansion began in earnest in the 1950s 
with the strong growth of educational enrollments in upper secondary school-
ing. It took up speed in the following decades when universities and technical 
colleges were opened to signifi cantly larger sections of the population. This 
process continued over the last two decades.  Between 1990 and 2008, the pro-
portion of the labor force with a tertiary degree increased from less than a 
fourth to more than a third in Britain,  Denmark, and Switzerland and from 
less than a fi fth to a fourth in Germany and Spain. In parallel, the share of 
the workforce without upper secondary schooling declined everywhere and 
dropped below 20 percent in Britain, Denmark, and Spain and below 15 per-
cent in Germany and Switzerland . 5 Moreover, statistics of educational attain-
ment probably underestimate the real extent of upskilling, as the qualifi cations 
of those with upper secondary schooling – still the majority of the population – 
increased at the level of both general education (A-Levels and Abitur instead 
of O-levels and Mittlere Reife) and vocational training (longer and more qual-
ifying apprenticeships) . 
 A more diffi cult question is to know whether this upward shift in skills 
has taken place in unison with occupational change. Causality between educa-
tional expansion and occupational upgrading may run in both directions. On 
the one hand, industrial automation , the spread of computers in services, and 
the massive decline in semiskilled jobs provided  incentives for young people 
to stay on in school longer and invest in their education. On the other hand, 
abundant skill supplies may also have led employers to adapt their production 
techniques and to create high-skilled jobs in order to benefi t fully from the edu-
cational profi les available on the labor market. 
 A counterfactual analysis run on our data suggests that the pattern of occu-
pational change predicted on the sole basis of skill evolution closely mirrors the 
observed pattern (Oesch and Rodriguez Menes  2011 : 521). Educational expan-
sion and occupational upgrading seem to have gone hand in hand in all fi ve 
countries.  However, the correspondence between educational upskilling and 
occupational upgrading is stronger in Denmark , Germany, and Switzerland , 
where vocational training dominates,  than in Britain and, above all, Spain, 
where educational expansion over the last two decades was particularly strong 
and outpaced occupational upgrading. 
 In effect, the skill evolution in Britain and Spain would lead us to expect a 
larger decline in low-paid occupations than the one observed in  Figure 4.1 . One 
key element is immigration: Both Britain and Spain experienced strong surges in 
immigration between the late 1990s and the crisis of 2007/8. While immigrants 
 5  Own computations based on data shown in  Table 4.1 . 
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were mostly low-skilled in Spain, they had a bimodal skill  distribution in 
Britain , with disproportional shares among both the least and the most highly 
educated (OECD  2008 : 83). We analyze the role of immigration by disaggregat-
ing relative change in employment for four nationality-gender groups: national 
women, foreign women, national men, foreign men.  Figure 4.3 shows the con-
tribution that these four groups make to the observed pattern of occupational 
change for Britain, Germany, Spain, and Switzerland (results for Denmark not 
shown here). Two fi ndings are noteworthy. 
 First, occupational upgrading between the early 1990s and the late 2000s 
was strongly fostered by national women. While the share of national 
women working in the low-paid jobs of quintile 1 decreased considerably, 
their proportion expanded massively in quintile 5 in all fi ve countries under 
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ES, 1990–2008 CH, 1991–2008
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 Figure 4.3.  Contribution of nationality-gender groups to the pattern of occupational 
change (relative change in employment in percentage points). 
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study. Accordingly, women’s catch-up process in educational attainment has 
 everywhere translated into higher occupational attainment. 
 Second, in Britain and Spain expansion in low-paid occupations of quintile 
1 was exclusively due to job growth among foreign workers. In the United 
Kingdom, the relative employment decline in quintile 1 among British men and 
women was overcompensated by the employment rise among foreign men and 
women. In Spain, foreign workers – above all, women – also increased their 
employment in quintile 1, whereas relative employment among Spanish men 
and women strongly fell. In Germany and Switzerland , employment shifts were 
similar for nationals and foreigners . 
 The U-shaped skill profi le of immigration contributed to occupational 
polarization in Britain. Comparable to Hispanics in the United States, East 
European immigrants in Britain supplied the manpower necessary to fi ll the 
gaps at the bottom end of the labor market (Wright and Dwyer  2003 : 308; 
Oesch and Rodriguez Menes  2011 : 531). Without the large surges in immi-
gration between the late 1990s and the mid-2000s, Britain and Spain would 
probably have experienced a stronger trend toward occupational upgrading – 
simply because employers would not have found as abundant a labor supply 
for low-paid jobs . 
 4.5.  What Implications for Inequality and Politics? 
 What are the social and political implications of an occupational structure 
that expands massively at the top, declines in the middle, and stagnates at 
the bottom end? Clearly, the labor market creates new opportunities at the 
high-skilled end of the occupational structure, but makes perspectives in the 
(lower) middle range of jobs bleaker.  Bleaker prospects primarily affect clerks 
and production worker s.  Their numbers have dropped and led to a thinning 
out of the twilight zone between the working and the middle class. Secretaries, 
tellers, craft workers, or plant operators are all occupations at the fringes of the 
lower-middle class that – while not requiring high levels of education – used 
to secure middle-range incomes and a steady rise in living standards . Today, 
people in these occupations do not face a bright future. In the case of plant clo-
sure, organizational downsizing, or career interruptions, they are exposed to a 
serious risk of social downgrading. 
 The drop in clerical and manufacturing jobs also means that workers who 
have limited education have fewer opportunities for upward mobility . Unlike 
the situation prevailing when industrial plants and organizational bureaucra-
cies expanded, it probably has become more diffi cult for people working in 
the least-paid jobs to move up in the employment structure. Large industrial 
fi rms, fi nancial conglomerates, or public utilities in postal services, telephone, 
and energy no longer provide ample job opportunities for semiskilled workers. 
Without higher education (advanced vocational degrees or schooling at the 
tertiary level), it probably becomes increasingly diffi cult to secure a job – or to 
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move to a senior position over the career – that provides a middle-class lifestyle 
(Wright and Dwyer  2003 : 322). 
 Ironically, future demand for low-skilled jobs may depend on the expansion 
among managers and profession als.  Personal services such as cleaning, home 
delivery, babysitting, or private security are determined by the geographic prox-
imity of wealthy customers and the extent of income inequality: The greater 
the difference between the customers’ purchasing power (the wealthy individu-
al’s income) and the price of the personal service (the poor individual’s wage), 
the greater the demand (Manning  2004 : 588). Combined with increasing mar-
ital homogamy (see  Chapter 6 by G ø sta Esping-Andersen, this volume) and 
the time constraints affl icting dual-earner households, occupational upgrading 
may thus generate the consumer demand for services supplied by low-paid 
workers. 
 In this context, Wright and Dwyer ( 2003 : 323) raise the question whether 
polarization in the U.S.  labour markets leads to a rise of master-servant 
 relationships – to a new cultural reality of social inequality where a grow-
ing share of the people at the bottom provide personal services to the peo-
ple at the top:  cleaning their house, ironing their clothes, delivering their 
groceries, babysitting their children.  Table 4.2 does not show a signifi cant 
increase among interpersonal service workers except in Britain . A possible 
explanation may be that higher wage fl oors – set directly by collective agree-
ments and indirectly by the welfare state – make McJobs economically less 
viable in Denmark , Germany , and Switzerland than in Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries. However, since our analysis only includes people spending at least 
twenty hours per week in formal employment, our results are likely to be 
lower-bound estimates. Part-time rs working few hours and illegal immi-
grants make up a sizable (and probably growing) share of the workforce in 
low-end personal services . 
 What are the political implications of unbalanced occupational upgrading? 
To begin with, there is the paradox that class divisions deepen, but class mobi-
lization weakens (Kohli forthcoming). Most available indicators suggest that 
the gap in earnings between the salaried upper-middle class es and the lower 
classes has widened over the last two decades. At the same time, the political 
mobilization of social class – notably of the working class, not the very upper 
class (Hacker and Pierson  2010 ) – has dwindled, be it in terms of strike activ-
ity, wage bargaining, or collective organization. A central piece in this puzzle 
is the decline among production workers .  Once the backbone of labor parties 
and trade unions, the industrial working class shrank by another third since the 
early 1990s and today accounts even in Germany  – the most industrial West 
European country – for less than a fourth of the labor force (see  Table 4.2 ). 
Outside the Scandinavian countries, union movements have been incapable 
of substituting their declining core constituency of male blue-collar workers 
with female employees in expanding social services, education, and health care . 
The results are lower union density, less inclusive collective bargaining, and 
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increasingly fl exible employment relationships (Bosch  2009 ; see also  Chapter 9 
by Anke Hassel, this volume, on the decline of trade unions). 
 In terms of political preference s, the implications are more diffi cult to grasp. 
Occupational upgrading has contributed to the increasing heterogeneity of the 
social structure , adding to the sector al heterogeneity that is shown in  Chapter 2 
of this volume. More fundamentally, it has provided new opportunities for 
some groups, while making life more diffi cult for others . The winners benefi ted 
from the opening up of tertiary education to new social categories and the 
growth of highly qualifi ed positions in the profession s and management. 
Thanks to the democratization of higher education and the expansion of busi-
ness and welfare services, large proportions of the population have obtained 
comfortable positions within the salaried middle class .  The losers are primarily 
found among blue-collar workers, semiskilled clerks, personal service workers, 
owners of small stores, and independent artisans who have lost out from both 
educational and occupational upgrading and fi nd themselves at the gradually 
less populated lower end of the social structure . The evolution toward a more 
skill-intensive and competitive service economy has worsened their job and 
mobility prospects. In addition, they are more vulnerable to economic open-
ness than the high skilled, either because their jobs can be offshored, or because 
the immigrant infl ow in their occupations tends to be larger (see  Chapter 5 by 
Dancygier and Walter, this volume). 
 This widening gap in life chances spills over into political and partisan pref-
erences (see  Chapter 8 by H ä usermann and Kriesi, this volume). The winners of 
upgrading have embraced libertarian and universalistic  values – among others 
strongly supporting parties of the New Left, notably the Green s – and are fi rm 
supporters of liberal democracy . In contrast, the losers have disproportion-
ately rallied around right-wing populist parties (Kitschelt  2007 ; Kriesi et al. 
 2008 ; Oesch  2012 ). This has happened in part because deindustrialization and 
educational expansion eroded working-class culture and organizations, leav-
ing an organizational void readily fi lled by right-wing populist movements. 
The populist Right’s angry resistance to cultural change, its solitary opposition 
against the political elites, and its pointed defense of national preference seems 
to strike a chord with the losers. In West European countries with a sizable 
right-wing populist party, production and service workers form the core of the 
party’s electorate (Bornschier and Kriesi  2012 ; Ivarsfl aten  2005 ; Oesch  2012 ). 
 The cleavage between losers and winners of social modernization over-
laps with a new geographical divide of which we only see fi rst contours. The 
 winners  – high-paid dual-earner couples working in management and the 
profession s  – primarily expand in the metropolitan centers and transform 
European cities into increasingly exclusive commercial and residential areas. 
West European capitals are thus undergoing a much faster process of occu-
pational upgrading than the suburbs, small towns, or countryside.  A prime 
 example is London. In 1981, inner London used to be more working class 
than the rest of England, but in 2001 it had a much greater concentration of 
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the middle and upper classes than outer London, the South East, or the rest 
of England (Butler et al.  2008 : 77).  In Paris, the expansion of the professional 
middle classes was even more pronounced. Its metropolitan area is increasingly 
segmented into three socially distinct spaces: The salaried upper-middle clas-
ses live in the cente; the working poor are relegated to the suburban sprawl; 
and the old (and lower-) middle classes settle in the periurban area of detached 
houses (Donzelot  2004 ). A  similar evolution can be observed in Southern 
European cities such as Barcelona, Lisbon, Madrid, Milan, or Rome, where the 
rising concentration of the upper-middle classes in the center contrasts with the 
peripheral settlement pattern of the working class and notably of immigrants 
(Arbaci and Malheiros  2010 ). 
 4.6.  Conclusion 
 In debates about society in the twenty-fi rst century, two notions hold great 
sway over both the academic and the general public: labor market dualization 
and the end of the middle class. Both ideas make reference to signifi cant phe-
nomena – the destandardization of employment and the increase in income 
inequality . However, another evolution in the labor market, namely, the per-
vasive upgrading of the occupational structure, has affected our societies to a 
much greater extent. This chapter examined how the occupational structure of 
fi ve advanced industrial democracies evolved since the beginning of the 1990s 
and produced four main fi ndings. 
 First, the different labor force surveys make a clear case for occupational 
upgrading.  Employment expanded much faster in high-paid occupations in 
management and the profession s than in mid- and low-paid jobs in produc-
tion, menial services, and the back offi ce. This shift in employment has funda-
mentally redrawn – and is still redrawing – the face of European societies .  As 
professional and managerial jobs expanded at the expense of the lower-middle 
class and the industrial working class, the class structure moved upward in all 
fi ve countries under study. Contrary to what newspapers like to claim, tech-
nological change has not eroded the middle class, but the ranks of production 
workers and offi ce clerks . 
 Second, occupational upgrading did not lead to major disequilibria in the 
labor market because it was accompanied by a major increase in the educa-
tional attainment of the workforces.  By supplying greater numbers of mid- and 
high-educated school leavers, educational systems successfully met the increas-
ing skill demands of fi rms . Occupational upgrading thus did not occur at the 
cost of low-skilled workers’ labor market prospects: Their employment rates 
did not signifi cantly decline in any of the fi ve countries studied. The growth 
in the numbers of tertiary-educated people and the parallel decline in those 
of people with only compulsory schooling explain why low-paid jobs could 
decline without causing a rise in low-skilled unemployment . Moreover, in 
countries with strongly growing low-end services such as Britain, Spain , or the 
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United States , the large infl ow of low-skilled immigrants provided the labor 
supply to fi ll these jobs. 
 Third, unlike studies on the American labor market, our analysis of 
European surveys produces, at best, lukewarm support for a trend toward 
employment polarization. It would be tempting to overplay the result of 
 polarization – because it makes for such a spectacular story (Goos et al.  2009 ). 
Yet our data make a much stronger case for occupational upgrading. Keeping 
this reservation in mind, several elements suggest that polarization may none-
theless become more consequential for the future of European labor markets . 
To begin with, employment dropped more in intermediary than in bottom-end 
occupations in Britain and, to a lesser extent, Denmark and Switzerland , as 
fi rms’ falling demand for production and back-offi ce staff led to a decline in 
lower-midrange jobs. Moreover, the comparison of age cohorts between the 
early 1990s and the late 2000s suggests that the employment structure evolved 
in a j-shaped pattern, with strong job creation at the top of the occupational 
hierarchy, a decline in the middle and relative stability at the bottom end.  In 
addition, low-skilled workers’ employment rates heavily depend on the under-
lying business cycles ; that is, they have been particularly heavily hit by the 
Great Recession . 
 Fourth, our evidence does not support the assumption, popular in the early 
2000s, that postindustrial economies could only achieve full employment if 
they opened their wage structure downward and created low-paid service jobs 
(Krugman  1994 ; Iversen and Wren  1998 ; Scharpf  2000 ). Nothing in our anal-
yses indicates that Scandinavian and Continental European countries need to 
travel down this desolate road. On the contrary, if governments want to sup-
port occupational upgrading, they seem well advised to take action at both 
ends of the labor market. At the upper end,  public investment in tertiary educa-
tion allows fi rms to hire high-skilled workers in suffi cient numbers and thus to 
take full advantage of technological advance . At the lower end, a strengthening 
of upper secondary education – notably vocational training – and the establish-
ment of a minimum wage incite fi rms to invest in workers’ productivity rather 
than to rely on a stagnant low-wage sector . 
 The central political implication of unbalanced occupational upgrading – 
whether accentuated by polarization or not – is the relative decline of originally 
powerful social-structural groups. The trend toward a more skill-intensive and 
competitive service economy worsened the job and mobility prospects of pro-
duction workers , semiskilled clerks, owners of small stores, and independent 
artisans, who fi nd themselves at the gradually less populated lower end of the 
social structure . As a result of this decline, we observe a decrease of the politi-
cal clout of the organizations that have defended the interests of these groups 
in the past, notably trade union s (see  Chapter 9 ), and a gradual shift of the 
representation of their interests to new organizations, notably the parties of the 
new populist Right (see  Chapter 8 ). 
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